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 Shareholder protection laws are a significant determinant of stock 
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 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions lead to international 
convergence in shareholder protection laws 
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enabling and 
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protection laws, we show that enabling rules drive these results 
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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
A central idea in corporate finance is the principal-agent problem that arises from the 
separation of ownership and control of the corporation. Legal rules play a vital role in 
mitigating the principal agency problem by restraining managerial opportunisms. This 
suggests that laws protecting shareholders play important role in stock market development. 
La Porta et al (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) confirm this relationship based on cross-
sectional studies of general aggregates quantifying shareholder protection. However, there 
have also been concerns about the accuracy of these legal data (Spamann, 2010); thus, the 
following is based on a more advanced index of shareholder protection, developed by the 
Centre of Business Research (CBR) at the University of Cambridge and available as panel 
data (Armour et al., 2009; Deakin et al., 2017). Using this data, a prior study found a more 
pronounced rise in paternalistic than enabling rules on shareholder protection since 1990 
(Katelouzou and Siems, 2015). This paper is the first one to econometrically assess the 
possible relevance of these two type of rules. 
 
2. Shareholder protection and stock market development 
The CBR shareholder protection data are available for 30 countries over the period 
1990-2013. As shown in Table 1, the following is based on the general aggregate of this 
index, the aforementioned sub-indices on paternalistic and enabling rules, and a number of 
control variables. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
*Manuscript
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Table 2 reports the base-line result on the relationship between shareholder protection 
and stock market development estimation using the Arellano and Bond general method of 
moment estimator. We specify the model using Equation (1). 
where MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP,  represents the instrumented 
electoral process change 1997-2012 (ELECPROCH) and   represents the control 
variables following Pagano and Volpin (2008). We report the results together with their 
standard errors in parentheses.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model 1, 2 and 3 are estimated with shareholder protection aggregate (SPI) aggregate, 
shareholder protection enabling (SPIE) and shareholder protection index paternalistic (SPIP) 
respectively as the main explanatory variables. The coefficient on our main variable of 
interest, SPI and SPIE display the expected signs and are statistically significant in Models 1 
and 2 respectively. This suggests that SPI and SPIE improve stock market development. For 
instance, a point increase in SPI in Model 1 leads to an increase of 0.43% in stock market 
development: Additionally, a point increase in SPIE in Model 2 leads to an increase in stock 
market development by 1.44%. No such significant relationship is found for SPIP. 
 
3. Convergence of shareholder protection laws 
Table 3 reports the results on the convergence of shareholder protection laws through 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, estimated using an ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimator. We run the regressions using the following general specification (2).  
     	  	  
   (1)  
 is the change in shareholder protection from 1990 to 2013. One at a time, of 
country j at time t.   is a vector of estimates of SPI_97, SPIE_97, SPIP_97 and SPI 
regressed one at a time. 
  is a vector of the control variables of country 	 at time  . 
Throughout the analysis, we estimate all coefficients based on double-clustered standard 
errors, the clustering is done at the country and year level (Petersen, 2009). Our main 
variables of interest are cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) and the interaction 
term of CBMA and shareholder protection index in 1997 (CBMA*SPI_97).  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
The results show that CBMA positively influences shareholder protection. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on CBMA is only significant for aggregate shareholder 
protection when an interaction term of CBMA and SPI_1997 is included in the estimation 
model. On the other hand, the coefficient on CBMA for SPIE increases in magnitude and 
significance if the interaction term CBMA and shareholder protection in 1997 is included. The 
positive relationship confirms our hypothesis on convergence by law through convergence by 
contract and is consistent with the findings of Pagano and Volpin (2006). The result also 
indicates that the initial level of shareholder protection is significant through its interaction 
with CBMA. The coefficient on the interaction between CBMA and initial shareholder 
protection index in 1997 however, shows a negative relationship with SPI index in 2012.  
We also measure the relationship between initial shareholder protection index in 1997 
and shareholder protection in 2012. The result shows a negative relationship between initial 
shareholder protection (SPI_97) and current shareholder protection index (2012). These 
results are also statistically significant at the 1% level for all SPI measures and are robust to 
        
   (2)  
the inclusion of the proportionality of the electoral system and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The results indicate that our sample countries have relatively improved on 
shareholder protection laws over the study period. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our findings shed new light on the law and finance relationship as well as on the issue 
of international and club convergence in shareholder protection. Using a panel data for 30 
countries over the period 1990-2013, shareholder protection is found to be significant for 
both questions. However, the distinction between enabling and paternalistic rules then shows 
that this is mainly due to the enabling rules of shareholder protection. This finding is 
remarkable as lawmakers have focussed more on increasing paternalistic rules (see 1., 
above); it also follows that the existing literature misses this core distinction in the 
relationship between law and finance. 
 
 
Table 1 
Definitions of variables 
Variable Abbreviation Description 
Shareholder protection index 
Enabling shareholder protection  
 
SPI 
SPIE 
Legal rules that protect shareholders 10-variable index. Source: CBR datasets at https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/datasets/  
Type of legal rules that give shareholders rights to do something (e. g, the right to appoint a proxy, the ability to file a claim) but leave it to 
shareholders themselves to decide whether or not to make use of such rights. Constructed as sub-index of the SPI. Available for the period 1990-
2012. Source: CBR datasets and Katelouzou and Siems 2015. 
Paternalistic shareholder protection  
 
SPIP Type of legal rules that aim to protect shareholders in all circumstances. Constructed as sub-index of the SPI. Available for the period 1990-
2012. Source: CBR datasets and Katelouzou and Siems 2015. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions  CBMA Sum of the number of completed cross-border merger and acquisition deals in a country. Available for the period 1997 to 2012. Source: Zephyr 
Bureau van Dijk 
Democracy polity  
 
DEM Composed of three interdependent elements; (1) the presence of institution and procedures through which citizens can express preference about 
alternative policy and leaders, (2) existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive and (3) the guarantee of 
civil liberty to all citizens in their daily lives and the act of political participation. It is an eleven-point scale indicator ranging from 0 to 10. 
Available for the period 1996-2013. Source: Polity IV Database, Centre for Systemic Peace at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html  
Electoral proportionality change  ELECPROCH Electoral proportionality change as in Pagano and Volpin (2006). 
Gross domestic product per capita GDPPC Gross domestic product per capita (calculated in constant US Dollars). Available for the period 1990-2013. Source: World Development 
Indicators at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
Domestic savings  
 
SAV Gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. Available for the period 1990-2013. Source: World Development Indicators at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
Domestic bank assets to GDP 
 
DBA Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP for the period 1990-2013. Source: Global F inancial 
Indicators at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global-financial-development 
Legal infrastructure  
 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 
LINFRA 
 
MGDP 
De facto 
     		 . Available for the period 1990-2013: Source: Societal Infrastructure and 
Development Project at https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/projects/research-themes/democracy-and-development/legal-infrastructures-project 
Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. Available for the period 1990-2012. Source: World Development Indicators at 
	
	

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Table 2 
Shareholder protection and stock market development using dynamic GMM 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
SPI  0.437*   
 (0.257)   
SPIE  1.44*  
  (0.809)  
SPIP   0.346 
   (0.23) 
LINFRA 0.515 0.981* 0.262 
 (0.36) (0.581) (0.195) 
SPI *LINFRA -0.084 -0.341 0.065 
 (0.065) (0.225) (0.058) 
DEM 0.0002 0.001 0.0006 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDPC 0.622** 0.531* 0.667** 
 (0.29) (0.284) (0.289) 
DBA -0.006** 0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
SAV -0.0006 -0.003 0 
 (0.107) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lagged MGDP  0.555*** 0.519*** 0.602*** 
 (0.049) (0.064) (0.043) 
Year Dummies YES  YES  YES 
Wald X2 12084.75 5854 52300 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
1st order autocorrelation -2.161 -2.33 -1.938 
 (0.030)** (0.019)** (0.052)* 
2nd order autocorrelation 1.34 1.397 1.281 
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.199) 
No. of observation 357 357 357 
Notes: This table reports estimates of three specifications of Equation (1). In each specification, the dependent variable is 
market capitalization scaled by GDP. The explanatory variables of key interest are SPI, SPIE and SPIP as defined in Table 1. 
We define all other control variables in the notes to Table 1. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as 
elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.  
Table 3  
Convergence in shareholder protection using OLS regression with robust standard errors. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Panel (A) 
 
SPI_97 
 
 
-0.571*** 
 
 
 
-0.566*** 
 
 
 
-0.619*** 
(-8.81) (-8.02) (-8.85) 
SPI -0.275 
(-1.12) 
ELECPROCH (1997-2012) -0.063 -0.136 -0.156 
(-0.49) (-0.8) (-0.75) 
CBMA 0.193 0.519** 
(-1.55) (-2.25) 
CBMA*SPI_97 -0.076 
(-1.47) 
Constant 4.513*** 4.494*** 3.884*** 2.470** 
(-13.16) (-12.25) (-8.28) (-2.59) 
R-squared 0.777 0.778 0.813 0.828 
Number of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Panel (B) 
 
SPIE_97 -0.365*** -0.356*** -0.443*** 
(-4.48) (-4.26) (-5.78) 
SPI -0.047 
(-0.29) 
ELECPROCH (1997-2012) -0.185** -0.284*** -0.029*** 
(-2.37) (-3.63) (-3.69) 
CBMA 0.186** 0.377*** 
(-2.76) (-2.86) 
CBMA*SPIE_97 -0.086 
(-1.97*) 
Constant 1.496*** 1.474*** 0.878*** 0.047 
(-5.93) (-5.73) (-3.72) (-0.11) 
R-squared 0.556 0.58 0.73 0.76 
Number of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Panel (C ) 
 
SPIP_97 -0.628*** -0.65*** -0.645*** 
(-7.50) (-6.92) (-5.79) 
SPI -0.562 
(-0.84) 
ELECPROCH (1997-2012) 0.124 0.13 0.125 
(-0.98) (-1.06) (-0.94) 
CBMA -0.013 0.023 
(-0.13) (-0.09) 
CBMA*SPIP_97 -0.018 
(-0.13) 
Constant 2.596*** 2.637*** 2.688*** 2.522** 
(-15.51) (-14.43) (-6.35) (-2.21) 
R-squared 0.614 0.619 0.62 0.62 
Number of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Notes: Dependent variable is change in shareholder protection from 1990-2013. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are 
based on double-clustered standard errors (clustering is done at the country and year level). For tractable interpretation, all 
the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
significance levels respectively.   
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